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THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS — EVANS V NEW SOUTH WALES   
Dan Meagher*
I INTRODUCTION 
This note will look at the litigation that arose in the lead-up to World Youth Day held 
in Sydney in July 2008. In Part II, the events that gave rise to Evans v New South Wales1 
will be outlined and the reasons of the Full Court of the Federal Court for its decision 
briefly explained. The consequences of the Court applying the principle of legality in 
Evans — which lay at the heart of its reasoning and decision — will be explored in Part 
III. First, I will consider how it impacted upon the argument made by the applicants 
that the relevant legislation was invalid for infringing the implied freedom of political 
communication guaranteed by the Australian Constitution. And second, I will discuss 
whether the decision in Evans highlights a lacuna in the legal protection of freedom of 
expression in Australia — as some commentators have suggested — and whether a 
statutory charter of rights would remedy this. And finally, in Part IV, I will make some 
observations about the principle of legality and the judicial protection of rights more 
generally. Taken together, these observations lead me to conclude that the judicial role 
in the protection of rights in Australia may be best served through the application of 
the principle of legality rather than an interpretive obligation under a statutory charter 
of rights.  
II THE CASE 
A Facts and legislation 
In the lead-up to World Youth Day — the week long pilgrimage of young Catholics 
held in Sydney in July 2008 — the New South Wales Government enacted the World 
Youth Day Regulation 2008 (NSW) ('WYD Regulation'). The WYD Regulation was made 
pursuant to the World Youth Day Act 2006 (NSW) ('the Act'). The Act, as its long title 
outlined, was 
to constitute a World Youth Day Co-ordination Authority, to confer certain functions on 
the Authority and to provide for the co-operation of other government agencies in the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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planning, co-ordination and delivery of government services in relation to World Youth 
Day 2008 and related events; and for other purposes. 
The applicants — the 'No to Pope Coalition' — were an organisation 'of persons and 
groups … opposed to the teachings of the Catholic Church on sexuality, contraception 
and reproductive rights.'2 The Coalition planned to peacefully confront the 
participants during World Youth Day events to communicate their concerns on these 
matters. In order to do so, they wanted to provide the pilgrims with 'items including t-
shirts, leaflets, flyers, stickers, condoms and coat-hangers. The coat-hangers [were] 
intended to symbolise the death of women from "backyard" abortions.'3  
It was the concern of the applicants that the Act and, in particular, the WYD 
Regulation, would prohibit them from distributing these materials and therefore 
preclude their planned protest. Section 46 of the Act prohibited the selling and 
distributing of 'prescribed articles' in areas controlled by the World Youth Day Co-
ordination Authority4 and the impugned clauses of the WYD Regulation read as 
follows: 
Clause 4 
(1) For the purposes of the definition of "prescribed article" in section 46 (10) of the Act, 
the following classes of articles are prescribed: 
(a) items of food and drink,  
(b)  religious items (for example, rosary beads, candles, candle holders, prayer 
tokens and prayer cards),  
(c)  items of apparel, including headwear, (for example, t-shirts, jumpers, jackets, 
pants, pyjamas, singlets, tank tops, shorts, wet weather jackets, caps, visors and 
hats),  
(d)  clothing accessories (for example, scarves, bandannas, socks, shoes and thongs),  
(e)  jewellery,  
(f)  giftware (for example, key rings, lapel pins, zipper pulls, magnets, removable 
tattoos, button badges, wristbands, mobile phone accessories, computer 
accessories, sunglasses, stickers and photo frames),  
(g) hard goods (for example, bottles, mugs, plates, spoons, ceramics and umbrellas),  
(h)  stationery,  
(i)  textiles (for example, beach towels and tea towels),  
(j)  philatelic and numismatic articles (for example, coins, postage stamps, 
envelopes and first day covers). 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
2  Ibid 578. 
3  Ibid 579. 
4  Section 46(1) defined an Authority controlled area as any of the following areas: (a) the area 
comprising, or comprising and adjacent to, a transport facility or interchange or a World 
Youth Day venue or facility, being an area that is specified or described in an order of the 
Minister published in the Gazette, (b) a public place, or any part of a public place, that is 
within 500 metres of a transport facility or interchange or a World Youth Day venue or 
facility, being a public place, or part of a public place, that is shown on a map referred to in 
an order of the Minister published in the Gazette. 
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Clause 7 
(1)  An authorised person may direct a person within a World Youth Day declared 
area to cease engaging in conduct that: 
(a)  is a risk to the safety of the person or others, or  
(b)  causes annoyance or inconvenience to participants in a World Youth Day 
event, or  
(c)  obstructs a World Youth Day event.  
(2)  A person must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a direction 
given to the person under subclause (1). 
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units.  
(3)  A person is not guilty of an offence under this clause unless it is established that 
the authorised person warned the person that a failure to comply with the 
direction is an offence.  
(4)  In this clause, "authorised person" means: 
(a)  a police officer, or  
(b)  a member of an SES unit (within the meaning of the State Emergency 
Service Act 1989) or a member of the NSW Rural Fire Service, but only if 
the member is authorised by the Authority in writing for the purposes of 
this clause. 
The applicants argued that s 46 of the Act and clauses 4 and 7 of the WYD 
Regulation were invalid for infringing the implied freedom of political communication 
guaranteed by the Constitution.5 In this regard, the High Court has made clear that any 
legislative or executive action that disproportionately burdens communication 
necessary for the effective operation of responsible and representative government 
guaranteed by the Constitution is invalid.6 The applicants further argued that clauses 4 
and 7 went beyond the scope of the regulation-making power provided by the Act and 
were invalid as a consequence.  
At the time there was also some urgency regarding the matter. The Coalition filed 
and served their application in the Federal Court on July 7 with the main World Youth 
Day events scheduled to commence on July 15 and conclude on July 20. Consequently, 
'[t]he Acting Chief Justice considered that the matter was of sufficient importance to 
justify a direction that the original jurisdiction of the Court in the matter be exercised 
by a Full Court'.7
B Decision and reasoning 
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court (French, Branson and Stone JJ) was 
delivered per curium on July 15. The Court held as follows: 
1 It was within its original jurisdiction to hear and determine the application — as 
provided by s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) — as it involved a 'matter 
…arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation'. Moreover, the 
Court noted that the adverse determination of the federal (constitutional) 
arguments did not preclude them from determining the non-federal claims; that 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
5  I will refer to it as the 'implied freedom' for the remainder of the note. 
6  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
7  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 581. 
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is, the proper construction of the impugned New South Wales Act and 
Regulation. The federal and non-federal claims involved in the controversy 'are 
all part of the federal jurisdiction conferred upon the Court. Nor does it matter 
to the scope of that jurisdiction whether the federal claim is defeated by a 
question of law or fact. That proposition is supported by a long line of 
authority.'8
2 The list of 'prescribed articles' in cl 4 were authorised by the regulation-making 
power of the Act. However, the items the applicants wished to provide to the 
pilgrims were not 'prescribed articles' on a proper construction of s 46 and cl 4 
and could, therefore, be lawfully distributed at World Youth Day events. 
Consequently, no question then arose as to the compatibility or otherwise of s 46 
or cl 4 with the implied freedom. 
3 Clause 7(1)(b) — 'to the extent that it purports to empower an authorised person 
to direct a person within a World Youth Day declared area to cease engaging in 
conduct that causes annoyance to participants in a World Youth Day event'9 — 
was not authorised by the regulation-making power of the Act and was 
therefore invalid. The other elements of cl 7 were so authorised and did not, 
moreover, infringe the implied freedom 'because they [were] directed not to 
communication, but to public safety and interference with the rights and 
freedoms of others.'10
In any event, in order to explain the reasoning of the Federal Court on the two 
substantive limbs of its decision (points 2 and 3 above) it is worth extracting s 58 of the 
Act which conferred the power to make regulations in the following terms:  
(1) The Governor may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, for or with 
respect to any matter that by this Act is required or permitted to be prescribed 
or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving 
effect to this Act.  
(2)  In particular, regulations may be made for or with respect to the following: 
(a) the fees and charges that may be imposed for the purposes of this Act,  
(b) regulating the use by the public of, and the conduct of the public on, 
World Youth Day venues and facilities,  
(c) regulating the provision of services by the Authority,  
(d) requiring the payment of fares or other charges for the use of any facility 
operated or service provided by the Authority or a government agency for 
the purposes of this Act,  
(e) conferring on the Authority any function that may be exercised by a 
council in relation to a public place,  
(f) requiring persons to submit to searches of themselves and their articles, 
vehicles or vessels (including searches conducted by electronic detection 
devices) as a condition of entry to any World Youth Day venue or facility,  
(g) excluding persons who refuse to submit to such searches from World 
Youth Day venues or facilities,  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
8  Ibid citing with approval this passage from Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd 
(2000) 104 FCR 564, 597 (French J with whom Beaumont and Finkelstein JJ agreed). 
9  See Evans (2008) 250 ALR 33, 55–6. 
10  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 580.  
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(h) the use of Randwick Racecourse for the purpose of one or more World 
Youth Day events (within the meaning of Part 9A).  
(3) The regulations may create an offence punishable by a maximum penalty of 50 
penalty units. 
1 The proper construction of section 46 of the Act and clause 4 of the WYD 
Regulation 
The essence of the first limb of the decision turned on the Court's characterisation of 
the items that the applicants wished to distribute to the pilgrims at World Youth Day 
events. However, it had to be first determined whether there was anything in s 46 of 
the Act that precluded the prescription by regulation of the sorts of articles listed in cl 
4. That section defined what constituted an 'Authority controlled area',11 vested certain 
powers in 'authorised officers'12 and most relevantly for present purposes defined 
what was a 'prescribed article' in order to create a related offence: 
 (3) A person must not sell or distribute a prescribed article during the sales control 
period in an Authority controlled area without the approval of the Authority. 
Maximum Penalty: $5,000. 
 (10)  In this section: "prescribed article" means an article of a class prescribed by the 
regulations as a being a prescribed article for the purposes of this section. 
The Court held that 'the validity of cl 4 cannot successfully be challenged on the 
grounds that it is not authorised by s 46(3).'13  
We do not accept the applicants' submission that 'there is simply no warrant in the Act to 
justify the prescription by regulation of articles such as food and drink, candles and 
stickers and hard goods'. There is nothing in the definition of 'prescribed article' that 
would exclude such articles from the ambit of regulation under s 46.14
It then fell to the Court to consider whether the items the applicants wished to give 
the pilgrims — condoms, coat-hangers, t-shirts, candles, stickers, button badges and 
leaflets — were 'prescribed articles' under cl 4. They held that nothing in the listed 
classes of articles covered condoms15 or (symbolic) coat-hangers16 and though leaflets 
and flyers may once have been 'stationery' they no longer could be so characterised 
when printed.17 Of more difficulty was whether the stickers and button badges were 
'giftware'. The Court defined 'giftware' as 'articles of merchandise that are used as gifts' 
and noted that a classification as such 'may depend on context.'18 So certain kinds of 
stickers and button badges — for example, those that 'might serve as souvenirs of the 
event and appropriate gifts for those who have an interest in the event'19 — may well 
constitute 'giftware' and therefore be caught by cl 4(1)(f). However, '[t]he same could 
not be said of the button badges and stickers that the applicants propose to 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
11  See above n 4. 
12  Section 46(10) 'In this section: "authorised officer" means a person authorised in writing by 
the Authority for the purposes of this section.' 
13  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 588. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid 589. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid 589–90. 
18  Ibid 590. 
19  Ibid. 
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distribute.'20 Presumably this is because with messages such as 'I don't believe Mary 
was a virgin! Is that annoying?' and 'I don't believe the Pope is infallible! Is that 
annoying?'21 they were hardly the sorts of event 'souvenirs' and 'gifts' that s 46 and cl 4 
sought to prohibit from being sold and distributed to the pilgrims during the World 
Youth Day events. A similar interpretive logic was applied to the characterisation of 
the applicants' t-shirts. Though clearly 'items of apparel' on the face of it — indeed 't-
shirts' were noted as one of the relevant examples in cl 4(1)(c) — the slogans which 
they were to bear placed them outside the class of articles contemplated by the WYD 
Regulation in the Court's view.22
In the result, none of the items which the applicants wished to distribute to the 
pilgrims were 'prescribed articles' under cl 4. It therefore followed that no issue as to 
the compatibility or otherwise of s 46 and cl 4 with the implied freedom could logically 
arise, even if the applicants' proposed conduct did amount to constitutionally 
protected political communication, which I would have thought likely on the facts. In 
this regard, the High Court in Lange said that the implied freedom 'necessarily 
protect[s] that freedom of communication between the people concerning political or 
government matters which enables the people to exercise a free and informed choice as 
electors.'23 Relevantly, in Evans the Court noted that the applicants were members of 
community groups that 'campaign[ed] on issues such as the Federal same-sex marriage 
ban and civil unions' and sought 'to persuade political parties at both Federal and State 
level to adopt policy positions that reflect the organisation's views and, where 
appropriate, to legislate to implement those policy positions.'24 Their proposed 
conduct formed part of this political activism and would likely be considered 'political 
communication' as a consequence, in my view, for its capacity to inform federal voting 
choices. 
2 The invalidity of clause 7(1)(b) of the WYD Regulation  
As noted, the Court held cl 7(1)(b) of the WYD Regulation exceeded the regulation-
making power of the Act and was invalid as a consequence. This followed from the 
application of what is now (judicially) known as the principle of legality. The Court, by 
way of explanation, cited the following High Court authority: 
The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with 
fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakeable and 
unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that purpose if they 
do not specifically deal with the question because, in the context in which they appear, 
they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with fundamental rights.25
In the context of s 58(2)(b) of the Act — which provided the power to make 
regulations for the regulation 'of the public on, World Youth Day venues and facilities' 
— the Court observed: 
The term 'regulating … the conduct of the public' is capable of a range of constructions 
from the regulation of any conceivable conduct to the regulation of conduct relevant to 
the events on World Youth Day. It may encompass acts and some or all forms of speech 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid 589. 
22  Ibid 590. 
23  (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560. 
24  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 585.  
25  Ibid 593 citing Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437. 
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and communication. There are constructional choices open. It is an important principle 
that Acts be construed, where constructional choices are open, so as not to encroach upon 
common law rights and freedoms.26
The Court acknowledged that the range of conduct prescribed by cl 7 implicated, at 
the very least, freedom of speech and said that '[w]hatever debate there may be about 
particular rights there is little scope … for disputing that personal liberty, including 
freedom of speech, is regarded as fundamental subject to reasonable regulation for the 
purposes of an ordered society.'27 Also pertinent to the proper construction of cl 7 in 
the context of the World Youth Day events was the significance of freedom of religious 
belief and expression within Australia's constitutional arrangements and under 
international law. The Court noted in this regard that 's 116 of the Constitution bars the 
Commonwealth from making any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion' and 
that religious 'freedom is recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'.28 It led the Court to conclude: 
No doubt conduct could validly be regulated which involves disruption of, or 
interference with, the free expression of religious beliefs by participants in WYD events. 
Clause 7(1)(c) relating to obstruction of WYD events is properly directed to such ends.29
However, the power provided to an authorised person by cl 7(1)(b) to direct a 
person at a World Youth Day event 'to cease from engaging in conduct that causes 
annoyance' to its participants was problematic on freedom of speech grounds and for its 
textual (and therefore legal) indeterminacy. The indeterminacy was said to arise from 
the fact that some of the pilgrims may have found the planned protests of the 
applicants to be 'mildly amusing' whilst others may have been 'annoyed by them' in 
the relevant sense.30 'There [was] no objective criterion to assist the judgment of "an 
authorised person" in deciding whether to issue a direction under cl 7.'31 The 
application by the Court of the principle of legality to this harm threshold ('causes 
annoyance') proved fatal to its validity. 
In our opinion the conduct regulated by cl 7(1)(b) so far as it relates to 'annoyance' may 
extend to expressions of opinion which neither disrupt nor interfere with the freedoms of 
others, nor are objectively offensive in the sense traditionally used in State criminal 
statutes. Breach of this provision as drafted affects freedom of speech in a way that, in 
our opinion, is not supported by the statutory power conferred by s 58 properly 
construed. Moreover there is no intelligible boundary within which the "causes 
annoyance" limb of s 7 can be read down to save it as a valid expression of the regulating 
power.32
The Court issued a declaration to this effect, notwithstanding the argument made 
by the State that to do so would involve the improper determination of an abstract or 
hypothetical legal controversy as 'the precise nature of the conduct in which the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
26  Ibid 592–3. 
27  Ibid 594. 
28  Ibid 596. On the basis of this discussion in the Evans decision, Kevin Boreham has 
suggested that freedom of religious belief and expression is now a fundamental right 
recognised by the common law — see 'International Law as an Influence on the 
Development of the Common Law: Evans v New South Wales' (2008) 19 Public Law Review 
271. 
29  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 597.  
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid.  
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applicants intend[ed] to engage [was] not clear.'33 There was, in the Court's view, 'a 
controversy sufficient to constitute a matter for the purposes of Ch III of the 
Constitution and the proper invocation of this Court's jurisdiction.'34  
III THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN EVANS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES AND RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
In this part of the note I will outline and critique the central reasoning of the Evans 
decision. I will do so by considering how the interpretive process (including the 
application of the principle of legality) meant that the question of constitutional 
validity of the legislative regime fell away in the Court's view. I then turn to assess the 
extent to which the principle of legality (compared with a statutory bill of rights) can 
provide meaningful protection of fundamental rights (including freedom of 
expression) in Australia. 
A The constitutional issue: did it fall away or was it avoided? 
In Evans, the applicants, as noted, argued that s 46(3) of the Act and clauses 4 and 7 of 
the WYD Regulation were invalid for infringing the implied freedom. The Court 
responded that '[i]f either of the clauses of the Regulation is not valid because it is not 
authorised by the WYD Act, then the question of constitutional validity falls away.'35 
To this end, as outlined in Part II, the Court held that none of the items the applicants 
wished to distribute were 'prescribed articles' under s 46(3) and cl 4 taken together and 
narrowly construed, and that the application of the principle of legality to cl 7 did 
invalidate that part of (1)(b) that sought to regulate conduct that may cause 
'annoyance' to the pilgrims. Consequently, 'the question of constitutional validity falls 
away.'36 This is the orthodox interpretive approach under Australian law:37  
If on its proper construction a statute does not offend against any constitutional 
limitation or prohibition it is not ordinarily appropriate for the Court to hypothesis a 
different construction and then test its constitutionality.38
So the constitutional issue in the context of the applicants' proposed conduct was no 
longer a live one once the Court found that none of the articles they wished to 
distribute were 'prescribed' and the application of the principle of legality to cl 7(1)(b) 
rendered it invalid. It led the Court to conclude: 
Read together with cl 4 of the Regulation for the reasons which we have outlined above, 
it does not impact on the proposed conduct of the applicants in any way that would 
constitute a burden on their implied freedom of political communication. That is 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
33  Ibid 598.   
34  Ibid. In this regard the Court noted at 598 that '[t]he wide scope of the Regulation in 
relation to conduct which causes annoyance is likely to catch at least some of the intended 
conduct. Moreover, it can be expected to have a chilling effect upon the exercise of their 
freedom of speech because of the very uncertainty about the degree of its infringement 
upon that freedom.' 
35  Ibid 587. 
36  Ibid. 
37  See Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, 186 (Latham CJ). 
38  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 587. 
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sufficient to dispose of the constitutional challenge to s 46(3) within the framework of the 
case presented to the Court.39
This necessarily follows, as the applicants' proposed conduct was found to be 
lawful through the interpretive process (and regulation invalidation) just described. 
There appeared, however, to be suggestions in the Court's judgment that they were not 
entirely comfortable with the breadth and scope of the legislative regime. For example, 
as it found that the items that the applicants wished to distribute to pilgrims were not 
caught by cl 4 then '[t]he question whether the reach of cl 4 may be excessive in other 
respects [was] not before the Court.'40 Similarly, on the issue of the legality or 
otherwise of the applicants' wish to distribute candles the Court said: 
There was little argument and no evidence given on these matters at the hearing. It [was] 
not possible for us to express an opinion as to which candles would be prohibited as 
religious items and which would not. The issue could only be resolved in the context of a 
particular prosecution brought following a failure to comply with regulation.41
And there appeared even some ambivalence in the Court's conclusion (quoted 
above) that the interpretive process undertaken 'is sufficient to dispose of the 
constitutional challenge to s 46(3) within the framework of the case presented to the court.'42 
These observations may of course have been no more than the Court making clear to 
the applicants that it will only finally determine those legal issues which squarely arise 
on the facts. But if they suggest that aspects of the legislative regime may be 
constitutionally problematic if considered in a different factual context — that is, 
regarding (proposed) conduct that is prima facie caught — then such an approach may 
have a downside from a rights perspective. And, arguably, it is to avoid the 
constitutional (implied freedom) issue through statutory interpretation rather than it 
falling away. But before considering whether this approach has a rights downside, I 
will briefly address the important threshold issue of whether it was even 
constitutionally permissible for the Court to consider the issue of the implied freedom 
in Evans once they held the applicants (proposed) conduct was lawful. 
The issue is whether it is constitutionally permissible for a Court exercising federal 
judicial power to determine the issue of the implied freedom if the applicants' 
proposed conduct or manner in which they argue their case does not in the Court's view 
challenge or impugn all those aspects of the legislative scheme that may be 
constitutionally suspect. That is, would such a determination amount to the resolution 
of an abstract or hypothetical legal question contrary to the Chapter III of the 
Constitution? In the process of explaining when it may provide for declaratory relief, 
the Court in Evans approved the following passage from the judgment of Lockhart J in 
Aussie Airlines Pty Ltd v Australian Airlines Ltd: 
The applicant for declaratory relief will not have sufficient status if relief is 'claimed in 
relation to circumstances that [have] not occurred and might never happen' … or if the 
Court's declaration will produce no foreseeable consequences for the parties.43
There is at least an argument that this principle gives a Court, in cases like Evans, 
sufficient scope to fully determine the compatibility or otherwise of a law with the 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
39  Ibid 591. 
40  Ibid 590. 
41  Ibid 590–1. 
42  Ibid 591 (emphasis added). 
43  (1996) 68 FCR 406, 414 cited in Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 598. 
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implied freedom. In Evans, for example, the applicants' proposed conduct involved the 
kind of direct political action in a crowded public space that will always have the 
capacity to play out in ways not planned but foreseeable that may enliven other parts 
of the legislative scheme. Moreover, as the Court explained in Evans: 
Importantly, the declaration sought is not about the lawfulness of the future conduct of 
the applicants in which event a degree of precision in the definition of that conduct 
would be necessary before such relief could be contemplated. What is sought is a 
declaration of the invalidity of an aspect of a law of general application.44
Assuming that it was permissible for the Court to more fully consider the 
constitutionality of the legislative scheme, then choosing not to may have a rights 
consequence. In the American context, Frederick Schauer argues that this interpretive 
approach — known as the Ashwander principle45 — does not in fact avoid 
constitutional issues.46 If in order to avoid a constitutional question the natural 
reading of a statute is displaced by a more strained — but nonetheless open on the text 
— construction then a court is impliedly recognising that without such an approach 
the statute may be constitutionally suspect. For if a court considers that a constitutional 
argument has little or no merit then it is unnecessary to give the words of the statute 
anything other than their ordinary and natural construction. Moreover and relevantly 
for present purposes, Schauer suggests that '[l]ike the Ashwander principle, plain 
statement rules [the American analogue of the principle of legality] sneak 
constitutional considerations in the back door, and thus again are instances not of 
avoiding constitutional questions but of deciding them.'47
Consequently, if the rationale of employing statutory interpretation (including the 
application of the principle of legality) to avoid constitutional issues is to avoid the 
costs of 'allowing an unelected judiciary unnecessarily to exercise the power to 
invalidate the acts of coordinate branches of the … government', then it is an 
interpretive approach that in Schauer's view must at the very least be re-evaluated. 
[I]n interpreting statutes so as to avoid 'unnecessary' constitutional decisions, the Court 
frequently interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, 
constitutional questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred. 
Accordingly, it is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a … statute that 
avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
44  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 598 (emphasis added). 
45  I acknowledge that I have taken this terminology — 'the Ashwander principle' — from 
Frederick Schauer, 'Ashwander Revisited' (1995) Supreme Court Review 71, 74. 
46  This is also the orthodox interpretive approach in American law — see Ashwander v 
Tennessee Valley Authority 297 US 288, 347–8 (1936) (Brandeis J); Edward J DeBartolo Corp v 
Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council 485 US 568 (1988). In some 
respects this makes good practical sense as the frequency of the United States Constitution 
(particularly its Bill of Rights) potentially intersecting with State and federal statutes is 
likely to be far greater than in the Australian constitutional context. It may also be 
politically and institutionally prudent for American courts to employ this interpretive 
approach wherever possible considering the robust and ongoing debate about the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review. 
47  Schauer, above n 45, 87–8 (footnote omitted). 
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invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same 
statute.48
However, even if the Court was not engaging in constitutional avoidance in Evans, 
the argument is still worth considering in the context of Australian (constitutional) law 
more generally. In Coleman v Power, for example, Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ 
applied the principle of legality to give a narrow construction to a broad and imprecise 
public order offence.49 In doing so they preserved the law's validity and avoided the 
issue of assessing its compatibility with the implied freedom.50 But Gummow, Hayne 
and Kirby JJ made clear that if the public order offence was not (narrowly) construed 
in this way then it would have infringed the implied freedom.51  
It might, therefore, be argued that a downside of applying the principle of legality 
as a method of constitutional avoidance in cases like Coleman (and maybe Evans) is 
that, from a rights perspective, it spares broadbrush and amorphous legal rules from 
rigorous constitutional scrutiny. It leaves on the statute book laws that have a very real 
capacity to chill freedom of (political) speech52 and that may, in any event, be found 
constitutionally suspect in the event of a future prosecution.53 This is particularly so if 
it's an approach that 'sneak[s] constitutional considerations in the back door'54 and into 
the interpretation process in any event. And to squarely confront the issue of the 
implied freedom may also better honour the spirit of giving constitutional rights and 
guarantees a broad construction, an approach that has often (though not always) 
characterised the contemporary rights jurisprudence of the High Court.55
However, for the reasons that I will detail in Part IV below a judge may consider — 
quite properly in my view — that the principle of legality still ought to be applied in 
these circumstances. That is, I will argue that in the interests of political responsibility, 
institutional modesty and constitutional harmony the judicial protection of rights is, on 
balance, best served by the application of the common law principle of legality where 
it is interpretively possible.  
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
48  Ibid 74 (footnote omitted). Schauer also notes at 89 that the upshot of applying the 
Ashwander principle is that constitutional adjudication is in fact undertaken 'without the 
necessity of the full statement of reasons supporting the constitutional decision.' 
49  (2004) 220 CLR 1, 75–7 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 96–9 (Kirby J).  
50  Ibid 74–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 98–9 (Kirby J).  
51  Ibid 77–9 (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 99 (Kirby J). In this regard their interpretive approach 
was 'reinforced' by principles of the implied freedom. 
52  However, it must be noted that, notwithstanding the problematic nature and scope of the 
World Youth Day legislative regime that remained on the statute book after Evans, it 
became a dead issue when the Act (and its accompanying regulations) were automatically 
repealed on January 1, 2009: World Youth Day Act 2006 (NSW) s 62. 
53  See Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 590–1. 
54  Schauer, above n 45, 87. 
55  See for example Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461; Australian Tape 
Manufacturers Association Ltd v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480, 509 (Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane and Gaudron JJ); Cheng v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 248, 277–8 (Gaudron J). But see 
Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission (2006) 226 CLR 362 where the High Court 
appears to have retreated to the more formal and narrow construction of s 117 of the 
Constitution that was categorically rejected in Street. 
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B The rights protective capacity of the principle of legality (compared with a 
statutory charter of rights) 
In the aftermath of Evans, George Williams and Nicola McGarrity lamented the fact 
that '[t]he court did not strike down the law because it infringed basic rights. It fell 
over on a technicality that can be easily repaired.'56 They were referring to the 
application of the principle of legality to cl 7 of the WYD Regulation that resulted in the 
invalidity of sub-cl (1)(b).  
The Federal Court decision means that regulations outlawing annoying conduct can be 
made in the future. As the NSW Government argued in court: 'The State Parliament has 
the power to make these kinds of laws if they wanted to.' There is little doubt that this is 
correct. The only restriction is that Parliament must make the law clear and wide enough 
to show it really did intend to restrict freedom of speech.57  
It is certainly true that clear and unambiguous statutory language will trump the 
interpretive presumption against the infringement of common law rights and 
freedoms.58 However, there must be a serious question as to whether a law that is clear 
and wide enough to catch annoying conduct would be compatible with the implied 
freedom. Indeed, as my above analysis suggests, the application of the principle of 
legality may well have preserved the constitutional validity of cl 7(1)(b). In any event, 
for Williams and McGarrity the Evans decision  
illuminates the fragile nature of freedom of speech in Australia. The right deserves better 
protection than the legal presumption that Parliament does not intend to breach the right 
unless it sets this out in clear terms. It is long past time that such an important freedom 
was safeguarded in a national charter of human rights.59
The underlying assumption is, then, that a charter of rights would provide more 
robust protection of freedom of speech than the application of the principle of legality 
in cases like Evans. However, I think it is far from self-evident that this would be the 
case assuming the rights charter contemplated by Williams and McGarrity is of the 
statutory kind operating in the ACT and Victoria.60 The charters do provide a strong 
guarantee of the right to freedom of expression.61 However, rights in a statutory 
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56  George Williams and Nicola McGarrity, 'A Victory Only Until the Next Time', The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney), 16 July 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2008/ 
07/15/1215887626477.html> at 2 August 2009.  
57  Ibid.  
58  Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).  
59  Williams and McGarrity, above n 56.  
60  This assumption can reasonably be made considering the strong and consistent case that 
George Williams has made for the adoption of statutory bills of rights at both the State and 
federal level — see for example George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (3rd ed, 
2007); George Williams, 'The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Origins 
and Scope’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 880. 
61  See for example the freedom of expression right in s 15 of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic): (1) Every person has the right to hold an opinion without 
interference. (2) Every person has the right to freedom of expression which includes the 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, whether within or 
outside Victoria and whether — (a) orally; or (b) in writing; or (c) in print; or (d) by way of 
art; or (e) in another medium chosen by him or her. (3) Special duties and responsibilities 
are attached to the right of freedom of expression and the right may be subject to lawful 
restrictions reasonably necessary — (a) to respect the rights and reputation of other 
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charter — such as freedom of expression — are not self-executing or legal trumps as is 
the case in jurisdictions with constitutional bills of rights. That is, they do not operate 
to invalidate legislation or executive action held by the courts to infringe rights. 
Instead they rely mostly on the interpretive obligation found in statutory charters for 
their efficacy and legal bite. In the Victorian Charter, for example, that interpretive 
obligation reads as follows:62
(1) So far as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory 
provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights. 
(2) International law and the judgments of domestic, foreign and international 
courts and tribunals relevant to a human right may be considered in 
interpreting a statutory provision. 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of— 
(a) an Act or provision of an Act that is incompatible with a human right; or 
(b) a subordinate instrument or provision of a subordinate instrument that is 
incompatible with a human right and is empowered to be so by the Act 
under which it is made. 
So in the context of interpreting laws of the kind considered in Evans a court must, 
if possible, give them a construction which is compatible with their underlying 
purpose and the right to freedom of expression. If it cannot do so for primary 
legislation (like s 46 of the Act) it may issue a declaration of incompatibility which then 
places certain legal obligations on the Parliament in respect of the law but does not 
invalidate it.63 On the other hand — and in the absence of an express regulation-
making power that permits the infringement of charter rights — if delegated 
legislation (like the WYD Regulation) cannot be given a rights compatible interpretation 
then it is invalid. This necessarily follows from the application of the core interpretive 
obligation to the provision in primary legislation that delegates the power to make 
regulations. That power can only sustain the making of regulations that are rights 
compatible as a consequence.64  
In any event and most relevantly for present purposes, as Chief Justice Spigelman 
of the New South Wales Supreme Court has recently pointed out, when a 'rights–
compliant interpretation provision is made expressly subject to the purposive 
requirement [as is now the case with the interpretive obligations in both the ACT and 
Victorian charters], its operation would probably be very similar to the principle of 
legality.'65 In other words, the core interpretive obligation when discharged by courts 
under a statutory rights charter — to construe laws in a manner that is compatible with 
their purpose and rights if possible — is essentially the same as applying that aspect of 
the principle of legality that says courts 'decline to impute to Parliament an intention to 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
persons; or (b) for the protection of national security, public order, public health or public 
morality. 
62  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32; see also Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT) ss 30 and 31. 
63  See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 36; see also Human Rights 
Act 2004 (ACT) s 32. 
64  See generally Carolyn Evans and Simon Evans, Australian Bills of Rights: The Law of the 
Victorian Charter and ACT Human Rights Act (2008) 135–6. 
65  Chief Justice James Spigelman, 'The Application of Quasi-Constitutional Laws' in Statutory 
Interpretation and Human Rights (2008) 51, 65.  
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abrogate or curtail fundamental human rights or freedoms unless such an intention is 
clearly manifested by unambiguous language'.66
Consequently, if Evans was decided in a charter jurisdiction in Australia, the court 
would hold that it was possible to interpret s 46(3) of the Act and cl 4 of the WYD 
Regulation in a manner that was consistent with the purpose of the legislative regime 
and protected the applicants' freedom of expression.67 In the Court's view that 
purpose was 'to prevent risks to public safety, inconvenience to World Youth Day 
participants and disruption of World Youth Day events.'68 Whereas that part of cl 7 
which sought to regulate conduct that causes annoyance to the World Youth Day 
pilgrims could not be construed consistently with that purpose and the right to 
freedom of expression of the applicants as it may catch 'expressions of opinion which 
neither disrupt nor interfere with the freedoms of others'.69 It would therefore be 
invalid as s 58 of the Act — the provision which grants regulation-making power — 
did not expressly authorise the creation of regulations that infringed freedom of 
expression.  
The upshot is that in jurisdictions with statutory charters of rights the result in 
Evans (and cases like it) would have been the same. This also suggests that — at least in 
terms of judicial outcomes70 — freedom of expression is not, necessarily, better protected 
under a statutory rights charter than in a jurisdiction where the principle of legality 
holds sway. 
I do not, however, wish to suggest that the principle of legality affords the same 
protection to the full panoply of human rights as a statutory rights charter. It clearly 
doesn't. The scope of rights considered by the common law to be 'fundamental' — and 
therefore subject to and protected by the principle of legality — is not only contested71 
but is considerably narrower than the rights enshrined in the statutory rights charters 
operating in the ACT and Victoria.72 And as Chief Justice Spigelman has suggested, it 
may well be the case that interpretive obligations in statutory rights charters 'can have 
some additional force when there is doubt about Parliament's intention in other 
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66  Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, 'The Meaning of Legislation: Context, Purpose and Respect 
for Fundamental Rights' (2009) 20 Public Law Review 26, 33.   
67  In doing so, the core interpretive obligation in s 32 of the Victorian Charter would be 
discharged.  
68  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 579. 
69  Ibid 597. 
70  Whilst it is true that in cases like Evans a statutory bill of rights or the application of the 
principle of legality would produce the same judicial outcome, under the former there are 
mechanisms that provide for pre-legislative rights scrutiny as well; for example, a rights 
compatibility statement must be prepared by the relevant member who proposes to 
introduce a Bill into the Parliament: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic) s 28; see also Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 37. This form of additional parliamentary 
rights scrutiny may well provide for more meaningful protection of charter rights 
(including freedom of expression) than would otherwise occur under the common law.  
71  See Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 593–5.  
72  For example, it is not a fundamental right at common law to be free from discrimination on 
the grounds of gender, race or religion. However, the right to legal equality is enshrined in 
the statutory bills of rights operating in the ACT and Victoria: see generally Chief Justice 
James Spigelman, 'The Common Law Bill of Rights' in Statutory Interpretation and Human 
Rights (2008) 1.  
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legislation because it is more likely that the judiciary will apply an express 
parliamentary authority than a common law principle.'73  
However, I do think that in the context of protecting rights in general, and freedom of 
expression in particular, that the principle of legality is not merely a 'convoluted legal 
fiction'.74 As Gleeson CJ has noted: 
The presumption is not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal 
democracy is likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is 
known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be 
interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.75
In this regard my analysis above demonstrates the rights protective capacity of the 
principle of legality and how it would be wrong to dismiss the significance and 
importance of orthodox principles of statutory interpretation in the protection of 
human rights in a contemporary context. 
IV THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA: SOME 
OBERVATIONS 
In the final part of the note I will make four observations about the principle of legality 
and judicial protection of rights more generally. The first concerns the fact that the 
interpretive rights presumption that is the cornerstone of the principle of legality can 
be displaced by clear and unambiguous statutory language. Whilst the implied 
freedom may, as noted, have precluded the New South Wales Parliament from doing 
so in relation to the anti-annoyance regulation invalidated in Evans, this interpretive 
proposition is nevertheless correct. So assuming the law is otherwise constitutional, 
'[t]he only restriction [imposed by the principle of legality] is that Parliament must 
make the law clear and wide enough to show it really did intend to restrict freedom of 
speech.'76 In the view of McGarrity and Williams, then, the Evans 'decision means that 
a future, properly made anti-annoyance law may have no legal remedy.'77 As a general 
interpretive proposition this is true enough, though it fails to recognise that such a law 
may in fact infringe the implied freedom. But more importantly it fails to grasp the 
underlying rationale of the principle of legality and the nature of the meaningful 
political constraint it places upon the Parliament. As the Court noted in Evans, '[t]he 
principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept 
the political cost.'78 This is no small matter and is precisely how it ought to be in a 
constitutional democracy in my view. A democratically elected Parliament may enact 
the legislation of its choosing — even when it is designed to infringe fundamental rights 
— knowing that it may pay the ultimate political price of being punished at the ballot 
box for doing so.  
Moreover, it may well be that this political constraint does more to focus the 
collective mind of Parliament on the rights implications of its legislation than would an 
after the fact judicial evaluation of its rights incompatibility. As noted, the animating 
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73  Ibid 65.  
74  Williams and McGarrity, above n 56. 
75  Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers Union (2004) 221 CLR 309, 329.  
76  Williams and McGarrity, above n 56. 
77  Ibid (emphasis added).  
78  Evans (2008) 168 FCR 576, 594 quoting Lord Hoffman in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department; Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131 (emphasis added). 
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idea of the principle of legality is that it forces Parliament to take political responsibility 
for its legislative actions. A judicial condemnation of legislation on rights grounds on 
the other hand gives legislators the political opportunity to 'hit back' at the courts for 
thwarting the democratic will of the people. And the fact that Parliament can still have 
the final say — and therefore responsibility — on rights issues under statutory charters 
of rights does not resolve this problem for the courts. Even if the Parliament resolves to 
amend its legislation to comply with a judicial rights declaration79 the courts may still 
be assailed by the other arms of government, the media and the wider citizenry. For 
example, criticism may be levelled for vindicating the rights of unpopular minorities (a 
common occurrence under rights charters and during the war on terror) or for 
'forcing'80 the Parliament to amend its legislation to comply with the rights views of 
'unelected and unaccountable judges'.81 In any event, as a consequence the courts may 
(reasonably or not) take some of the political opprobrium for legislation that the 
Parliament would and should otherwise have to accept in full. 
My second and related observation relates to the common law lineage of the 
principle of legality. The slow and incremental development of the principle has 
imbued it with the collective experience and wisdom of centuries of judicial decision-
making.82 This common law pedigree gives the principle of legality its strength, 
legitimacy and centrality in our system of constitutional government. Indeed it makes 
clear why this interpretive principle is now often characterised as 'quasi-
constitutional'83 for it 'reflect[s] fundamental assumptions about the relationship 
between citizen and state.'84 Similarly important in my view is that it leaves it to 
Parliament alone to strike the (difficult) balance in legislation between the full range of 
competing rights and interests that inevitably arise in complex issues of social policy. 
In order to do so it has the procedures for meaningful collective deliberation, the 
ability to be proactive (not simply reactive to litigation) and, most importantly, has the 
time and resources to undertake parliamentary and departmental inquiries on these 
issues and produce detailed and expert accompanying reports. These institutional 
characteristics and strengths of Parliament make it far better equipped and capable of 
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79  This has for example always been the course of action in response to a judicial declaration 
of rights incompatibility in the United Kingdom — see Francesca Klug and Keir Starmer, 
'Standing Back From the Human Rights Act: How Effective is it Five Years On?' (2005) Public 
Law 716, 721.  
80  Though Parliament cannot be legally forced to amend their legislation under a statutory 
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amend its legislation to comply with a judicial rights assessment rather than engage in the 
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James Allan, 'The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Exegesis and 
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83  See generally Spigelman, above n 65. 
84  Ibid 56.  
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undertaking this sort of complex polycentric decision-making than the courts in my 
view.85  
However, the interpretive obligation in statutory rights charters may well compel 
the courts to do something very similar in most 'rights' cases. The point is not that such 
an interpretive process is undemocratic — it is Parliament after all that has placed this 
interpretive obligation on judges86 — but that the courts lack the same institutional 
strengths of Parliament needed to address the variety of complex social policy issues 
that arise in assessing the compatibility or otherwise of legislation with a statutory bill 
of rights. The courts may well be on a hiding to nothing regarding their interpretive 
role and decision-making under a statutory rights charter. They lack the institutional 
resources needed to properly discharge this very difficult role and their rights 
assessments, no matter how legally sound and well-reasoned given the circumstances, 
will always be contested considering the intractable nature of most rights disputes. 
Again, the fact that Parliament can — if it chooses — have the final say on rights issues 
under statutory charters does not in my view change the problematic nature of this 
judicial role. The long term risk is that the authority of judicial decision-making more 
generally may be eroded if the public and the other arms of government consider its 
rights jurisprudence — a clearly important and high profile part of its judicial work — 
to be too close to the contested political realm and less worthy of respect as a 
consequence. It would be most unfortunate if the well-intentioned expectation that the 
protection of human rights would be better served by an increased judicial role 
resulted in the legitimacy of the judicial function being increasingly called into 
question.  
My third observation is that the principle of legality — compared with the 
interpretive obligation under statutory rights charters — provides for the kind of 
'institutional interaction'87 between the courts and Parliament that may better reflect 
the established and accepted role of the judiciary under the Australian system of 
constitutional government. That role involves the final and conclusive determination 
of the legality of legislative and governmental action that is so critical to the 
maintenance of the rule of law. In doing so, the courts inevitably clash with the 
legitimate interests and priorities of the other arms of government. This tension is no 
bad thing. Indeed it is considered a desirable state of affairs in a constitutional 
democracy like Australia where the separation of powers holds sway.88 On the other 
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hand, the making of (rights) declarations in cases that have no legal effect on the 
litigating parties or the impugned law — which currently occurs under the charters 
operating in the ACT and Victoria — is not something that Australian courts 
traditionally do.89 For example, under the Victorian Charter it is expressly provided 
that a judicial declaration of the rights incompatibility of legislation does not affect its 
validity. Moreover, in the event that a public authority infringes the Charter rights of a 
citizen, no damages may be awarded for that breach and no enforceable legal right or 
civil cause of action is created.90  
This is not to suggest that courts ought never to be vested with new powers and 
functions. They, like all institutions of government, must evolve to meet new 
challenges in order to remain relevant.91 But consider the High Court's classic 
statement of what constitutes 'judicial power':  
[It is] the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide 
controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights 
relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some 
tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to 
appeal or not) is called upon to take action.92
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89  For example, the jurisdiction of the High Court and all other federal courts established 
under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution extends only to the hearing and 
determination of 'matters'. The High Court has said that 'there can be no matter …unless 
there is some immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of 
the Court': Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 265 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, 
Powers, Rich and Starke JJ). On the other hand, State courts can be vested with and exercise 
both judicial and non-judicial powers so long as the latter do not compromise their 
independence and institutional integrity as a court: Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
However, the following passage makes clear the essence of the judicial function in 
Australia: 'Judges do not set their own agenda. They deal with issues that litigants bring to 
them for decision. They cannot avoid questions that have to be answered to decide the 
cases that come to them; and they cannot answer questions that are not brought to them for 
decision. Australian courts do not give advisory opinions. They resolve concrete issues 
raised by disputing litigants': Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, The Rule of Law and the 
Constitution (2000) 99.  
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Australia Conference on the Australian Justice System in 2020, Sydney, 25 October 2008) 20 
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Publications/SUPREME+-+Speeches+-+Justice+Weinberg> at 2 August 2009. 
91  See for example the Federal Justice System Amendment (Efficiency Measures) Bill (No 1) 
2008 (Cth) which will allow the Federal Court to refer complex technical questions that 
arise in a case to an expert referee who will undertake an inquiry and then provide a report 
to the Court. This mechanism is designed to facilitate quicker and less costly trials, 
especially of large commercial matters; see generally Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, 'The 
State of the Judicature' (Speech delivered at the 35th Australian Legal Convention, Sydney, 
25 March 2007) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/publications_05_2.html# MurrayGleeson> at 
2 August 2009.  
92  Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ). 
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The essence of 'judicial power' is, then, the determination of legal controversies 
through binding and authoritative decisions. And in my view it is these core qualities 
that underpin the public's faith in and respect for Australian courts. So we must 
carefully think through the consequences of asking our courts to perform an 
interpretive function that in important respects is considerably removed from the 
heartland of judicial power. The notion of courts making rights declarations that are 
not binding and authoritative on the litigating parties may make perfect sense to those 
steeped in the theory and practise of statutory rights charters. But I'm not so sure the 
citizen as litigant will necessarily see the wisdom of having to expend considerable 
time and money to litigate a case where the judge is precluded from finally 
determining the rights controversy that arises and providing the appropriate remedy. I 
suspect that, like reputation, judicial legitimacy — one of the cornerstones of 
Australia's system of constitutional government — is hard won but too easily lost.  
Finally, as noted, the judicial protection of rights through the principle of legality 
leaves to the arena of democratic politics the legal determination of rights issues. In 
this way the contentious rights issues of the day are publicly considered and debated 
by the citizenry and legislatively resolved through their democratic institutions. This 
constitutional framework may serve to strengthen our democratic institutions by 
promoting a political and legal culture where the people (not judges) are primarily 
responsible for settling rights disputes. Moreover, legislative decisions on rights are 
capable of being revisited. The democratic space remains open, which is entirely 
appropriate considering the intractable nature of most rights issues. It is true, as noted, 
that judicial rights decisions under statutory charters are not necessarily final either. 
But the courts remain an important and high profile forum (and therefore focus) of 
those seeking legal vindication of their rights; particularly when the other arms of 
government routinely defer to judicial rights decisions.93 It is important, then, to fully 
consider the wisdom of establishing a set of institutional arrangements to protect and 
promote human rights that may have as an unintended consequence the potential to 
'weaken the sinews of … democracy'94 in Australia. 
V CONCLUSION 
This note has done three things. First, it outlined the events that occurred in the lead-
up to World Youth Day 2008 that were litigated in Evans v New South Wales and the 
reasons for decision of the Full Federal Court in that regard. Second, it explored what 
the application of the principle of legality in Evans meant for the freedom of political 
communication protected by the Constitution and the protection of fundamental rights 
more generally. And finally, it made four observations about the principle of legality 
that led to the conclusion that the judicial role in the protection of rights in Australia 
may be best served through this interpretive principle rather than an interpretive 
obligation under a statutory charter of rights. 
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